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Advertisement revenue is necessary to maintain our quality and independence. To do this, please subscribe here. You will receive a welcome e-mail to validate and confirm your subscription. Thank you for your consideration. Die Abwehrstrategien gegen dateilose Angriffe. But social science research has demonstrated that most defendants with mental retardation are unlike their peers of average intelligence in their cognitive and behavioral capacity, a difference with profound effects on their blameworthiness.
But while that decision has begun to percolate into the rest of criminal law, it has not yet reached the law of statutory rape. A close analysis of statutory rape law reveals certain assumptions which allow such a low standard of proof for such a significant offense: When examined in light of research about mental retardation, however, these assumptions collapse. Indeed, punishing a person with mental retardation without regard to his awareness of the law, social cues, and the nature of his conduct may also run afoul of constitutional due process and proportionate sentencing principles.
This article therefore argues that the prosecution of statutory rape should be modified for defendants with mental retardation. The government should have to prove that a defendant with mental retardation had the mens rea to commit the offense. In addition, this article recommends formalizing the existing ways of addressing the difference in culpability of this population through charging and sentencing. Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience.
According to a wide variety of scholars, scientists, and policymakers, neuroscience promises to transform law. Many neurolegalists - those championing the power of neuroscience for law - proceed from problematic premises regarding the relationship of mind to brain.
This Article makes the case that their accounts of the nature of mind are implausible and that their conclusions are overblown.
Thus, their claims of the power of neuroscience for law cannot be sustained. The Article discusses a wide array of examples including lie detection, criminal-law doctrine, economic decision-making, moral decision-making, and jurisprudence. As the capabilities of cognitive neuroscience, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging fMRI 'brain scans,' have become more advanced, some have claimed that fMRI-based lie-detection can and should be used at trials and for other forensic purposes to determine whether witnesses and others are telling the truth.
Although some neuroscientists have promoted such claims, most aggressively resist them, and arguing that the research on neuroscience-based lie-detection is deeply flawed in numerous ways. And so these neuroscientists have resisted any attempt to use such methods in litigation, insisting that poor science has no place in the law. But although the existing studies have serious problems of validity when measured by the standards of science, and true as well that the reliability of such methods is significantly lower than their advocates claim, it is nevertheless an error to assume that the distinction between good and bad science, whether as a matter of validity or of reliability, is dispositive for law.
Law is not only about putting criminals in jail, and numerous uses of evidence in various contexts in the legal system require a degree of probative value far short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And because legal and scientific norms, standards, and goals are different, good science may still not be good enough for some legal purposes, and, conversely, some examples of bad science my, in some contexts, still be good enough for law. Indeed, the exclusion of substandard science, when measured by scientific standards, may have the perverse effect of lowering the accuracy and rigor of legal fact-finding, because the exclusion of flawed science will only increase the importance of the even more flawed non-science that now dominates legal fact-finding.
And thus the example of neuroscience-based lie detection, while timely and important in its own right, is even more valuable as a case study suggesting that Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals may have sent the legal system down a false path. By inappropriately importing scientific standards into legal decision-making with little modification, Daubert confused the goals of science with those of law, a mistake that it is not too late for the courts to correct.
Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law. The possibility of using neuroimaging to detect deception in legal settings has generated widespread resistance. Many neuroscientists insist the research is flawed science, containing weaknesses of reliability the degree of accuracy , external validity do laboratory results predict real-world outcomes , and construct validity do studies test what they purport to test.
These flaws are real, but although using neural lie-detection in non-experimental legal settings is premature, the critics are mistaken in believing that scientific standards should determine when these methods are ready for legal use. Law's goals differ from science's, and the legal suitability of neural lie-detection depends on legal standards and not those determining what good science is.
From Moral to Legal Judgment: Various kinds of normative judgments are an integral part of everyday life. The authors extended the scrutiny of social cognitive neuroscience into the domain of legal decisions, investigating two groups, lawyers and other academics, during moral and legal decision-making.
Comparing both groups, the data show that behaviorally lawyers conceived themselves as emotionally less involved during normative decision-making in general. Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics. This article addresses one cornerstone of neoclassical economic theory, namely that rational consumers pursue their economic self-interests. This article first outlines how this assumption of self-interest has shaped U.
It next surveys the behavioral experiments, which show that many individuals do not solely pursue their self-interest. Indeed, appealing to self-interest, as several of these experiments demonstrate, may lead to suboptimal outcomes. The assumption also disregards the important effect of social, ethical, and moral norms on human behavior. Because the assumption of self-interest is not descriptive, the article next addresses whether governmental policies should advocate the pursuit of self-interest.
Using the recent findings from the happiness economic literature, this article shows why appealing to self-interest may make citizens more, not less, miserable. It then discusses the risks if governmental policies prime individuals to pursue their self-interest. The article has broad implications for U.
Tort Damages and the New Science of Happiness. The happiness revolution is coming to legal scholarship. Based on empirical data about the how and why of positive emotions, legal scholars are beginning to suggest reforms to legal institutions. In this article the authors aim to redirect and slow down this revolution. One of their first targets of these legal hedonists is the jury system for tort damages.
In several recent articles, scholars have concluded that early findings about hedonic adaptation and affective forecasting undermine tort awards for pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-economic damages.
In the shadow of a broader debate about the propriety of indefinite damages, the legal hedonists argue that these findings provide new support for the argument that jurors cannot award indefinite damages rationally or consistently. The legal hedonists argue that, on the one hand, awards for non-economic tort damages are inappropriate, because individuals will adapt to any negative emotional or physical state.
On the other hand, they argue that jurors are incapable of granting these damages, because they systematically predict inaccurately the impact of injuries upon tort victims. The authors conclude that these legal hedonists understate the flexibility of the law and overstate dated empirical research on which their arguments are based. First, the law is more nuanced than these legal hedonists care to admit.
To the extent it is appropriate, the law allows jurors to take account of adaptation, and more importantly, the law provides compensation for far more than just emotional changes. It compensates for loss of capabilities, loss of emotional and experiential variety, and lost options.
Second, recent studies document the incompleteness and variability of hedonic adaptation. This reinforces concerns about basing legal policy on hedonic adaptation and the belief that judges and juries, acting in combination, appropriately individuate tort awards. That said, the authors conclude that expert testimony may help jurors craft awards by providing information about hedonic and non-hedonic losses. Scientific Understandings of Postpartum Illness: Improving Health Law and Policy?
Mindfulness, Emotions, and Ethics: What role do emotions play in ethical decision-making? Philosophers have long debated the question, disagreeing about both the nature of "the good" and how best to achieve it. Rationalists ground one's capacity for virtue in logic and deliberate cognition, while moral intuitionists look to one's capacity for feeling deeply.
Immanuel Kant, for example, maintained that right conduct flowed from a sense of duty that functioned independently of emotion. Conversely, David Hume argued that all right action involved sentiment and that reason, stripped of passion, could not impel ethical choice.
Philosophers are not alone in their fascination with the question. Psychologists also have delved into the relationship between emotion and moral development, creating varying models of maturation that either embrace or reject emotion as a critical component of moral discernment.
Today, debates in the "soft sciences" of the mind spill into the "hard sciences" of the body. Interest in the biological bases of emotion invigorates neuroscience, and developments in functional magnetic resonance imagery fMRI promise methods for mapping the synaptic pathways that induce affective states. Although we can now detect activity in portions of the brain associated with emotional experience, it remains unclear whether those electrical surges push us in "right" or "wrong" directions.
In the mediation world, scholars and practitioners frequently treat emotion as the unruly step-child of the problem-solving mind. Professor Leonard Riskin characterizes emotion as a potential negotiation saboteur and offers "mindful practice" as a useful corrective. He argues that mindful mediation can help negotiators gain better control over their wandering minds and negative emotions, and achieve more satisfying, interest-based solutions.
This essay celebrates Riskin's call to arms while suggesting some limits to what mindfulness can achieve in the ethical realm. It examines in more detail the relationship Riskin posits between mindful practice and ethical decision-making.
It discusses recent developments in neuroethics that imply a prominent role for emotions in establishing ethical restraint. It also surveys a growing body of evidence that suggests the directive power of our emotions remains largely hidden from and impervious to the control of our "reasoning" selves.
Lastly, it examines what Riskin has, in an earlier work, described as the ethical "hard case" in light of recent explorations into the emotional wellsprings of deontological versus consequentialist thinking.
This article challenges the conventional wisdom that claimants in class action settlement funds and other settlement funds make independent and rational settlement decisions. Such studies show that decision-makers routinely change their minds based on their view of the status quo, the timing of the decision, and the presence of seemingly irrelevant choices. Because of these cognitive biases, people will buy things they do not want, save too little for retirement, and make risky choices about their health and well-being based on the timing, context, and framing of the decision.
Applying findings from cognitive psychology, this article argues that people will make the same kinds of irrational decisions about their settlement options in a large settlement fund. As a result, cognitive biases threaten to undermine many of the stated purposes of large settlement funds--to provide claimants with access, efficiency, and equity superior to what they could obtain in traditional litigation.
Fund designers, however, should avoid reforms that unduly eliminate settlement options, or that impose excessive administrative costs. Rather, the benefits of any reform-- preventing avoidable harm to irrational claimants--must outweigh the potential costs, including the value of client autonomy, the chance of error, and the burden on the courts and public administrators.
Neuroimaging, Culture, and Forensic Psychiatry. The spread of neuroimaging technologies around the world has led to diverse practices of forensic psychiatry and the emergence of neuroethics and neurolaw. This article surveys the neuroethics and neurolegal literature on the use of forensic neuroimaging within the courtroom. Next, the related literature within medical anthropology and science and technology studies is reviewed to show how debates about forensic neuroimaging reflect cultural tensions about attitudes regarding the self, mental illness, and medical expertise.
Finally, recommendations are offered on how forensic psychiatrists can add to this research, given their professional interface between law and medicine. At stake are the fundamental concerns that surround changing conceptions of the self, sickness, and expectations of medicine. Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice. This article focuses on the connection between neuroscience and juvenile justice.
Aronson discusses whether the new neuroscience provides sufficiently reliable evidence to establish meaningful differences between adolescent and adult brains and whether science should mitigate the culpability of juvenile defendants and prevent them from being tried in the adult criminal justice system. He concludes that there is still too much scientific disagreement about the relationship between brain structure and decision-making capacity to even contemplate using neuroscience in this way.
He notes that the few studies that have shown some link have had significant methodological flaws. In the end, Aronson is not convinced that neuroscience will be able to explain adequately why some teenagers commit crimes and others do not because so many other factors are involved in anti-social behavior, especially socioeconomic issues. He concludes by suggesting that our desire to find a scientific solution to questions of justice may be fundamentally misguided.
Damages and the Reptilian Brain. Repellent Crimes and Rational Deliberation: Emotion and the Death Penalty. It is often assumed that the anger, outrage, and other strong emotions provoked by repellent crimes interfere with rational deliberation.
There is some truth to the notion that heinous murders and other shocking crimes place an enormous strain on the criminal justice system and may exert a destructive influence on institutional process. Nevertheless, the argument that strong emotion interferes with rational deliberation begs the question: In this article, Bandes argues for an understanding of rational deliberation that recognizes its pervasive emotional content. Bandes suggests that the legal system operates on certain misconceptions about emotion that are harmful to the institutional process.
The most pervasive misconception is that the very attempt to address emotion is destabilizing to the rule of law. Though the legal system rarely incorporates scientific or social-scientific knowledge of emotional dynamics, it nevertheless operates on its own assumptions about how emotions work.
It tends to take three approaches to emotion: This article argues that the legal approach to emotion and rationality is based on three primary misconceptions about the nature of emotion: Using the example of capital punishment, Bandes illustrates that these misconceptions have serious consequences for the structure and operation of the capital system.
Deception, Decisions, and Investor Education. Tens of millions of dollars each year are spent on investor education. Because older adults those aged sixty and older are disproportionately victims of investment fraud schemes, many educational programs are targeted at them. In this article, Professor Barnard questions the effectiveness of these programs. She then suggests that many of the factors that contribute to fraud victimization are unlikely to be influenced by fraud prevention education.
She also recommends alternative uses for the money now spent on fraud prevention education that would better achieve the goal of protecting older investors. For over years, Western courts have considered pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity NGRI for defendants in possession of a mental defect rendering them unable to understand the wrongfulness of their act.
Until recently, determining the mental state of a defendant has fallen largely upon the shoulders of court psychologists and experts in psychiatry for qualitative assessments related to NGRI pleas and mitigation at sentencing.
However, advances in neuroscience - particularly neurological scanning techniques such as magnetic resonance imaging MRI , functional magnetic resonance imaging fMRI , computed tomography scanning CT , and positron emission tomography scanning PET - may provide additional, pertinent biological evidence as to whether an organically based mental defect exists.
With increasing frequency, criminal defense attorneys are integrating neuroimaging data into hearings related to determinations of guilt and sentencing mitigation. This is of concern, since not all brain lesions and abnormalities indicate a compromised mental state that is relevant to knowing whether the act was wrong at the time of commission, and juries may be swayed by neuroscientific evidence that is not relevant to the determination of the legal question before them. This review discusses historical and modern cases involving the intersection of brain lesions and criminality, neuroscientific perspectives of how particular types of lesions may contribute to a legally relevant mental defect, and how such evidence might best be integrated into a criminal trial.
Cognition and Star Trek: Learning and Legal Education. Research in education, cognitive and experimental psychology and neuroscience are a few of many fields that can offer insight into legal academic techniques that can be used to improve teaching and learning in the classroom. Expanding Atkins and Roper: The article addresses whether or not individuals suffering from schizophrenia should be subject to capital punishment.
The author sets out to navigate between psychologism or extreme naturalism and supernaturality or extreme anti-naturalism , by developing a biologically based theory of judgment premised on the notion that a cognitive system's capacity to learn depends on its capacity to modify its processes of judgment in response to experiences and environmental stimuli. Psychologistic approaches to the nature of thought, the author notes, are traditionally seen as erroneously conflating the laws of logic with empirically derived laws of thought.
He proposes that such approaches be placed on an axis. Conceptually, it sees neither language nor community and environment as being essential to judgmental activities. NFC amounts to a biologized theory of judgment which centers on a Heideggerian-like pre-linguistic capacity--an a priori function that is responsive to environmental norms. It allows a distinction to be drawn between three levels of cognitive capacity with which systems respond to their environment: Each level is characterized by particular types of learning mechanisms and moral function.
The NFC approach puts forward a textured idea of judgment as a biological capacity to skillfully cope with the environment--a capacity that can be developed through experience. Although it has a biological basis, NFC is in step with the Aristotelian notion that the end of reason is to encourage human flourishing, and not the reverse.
What it means to be rational is important to the law, and if the NFC approach is right, the purposes of reason and the purposes of law will best be furthered by systems that take due account of our biological nature. Consciousness and Culpability in American Criminal Law. American law requires a voluntary act or omission before assigning criminal liability. The law also presumes that an individual who is unconscious, such as a sleepwalker, is incapable of a voluntary act.
For some criminal defendants in the United States this all-or-nothing approach to the voluntary act requirement can mean the difference between unqualified acquittal if they are found to have acted involuntarily, lengthy institutionalization if they are found to be insane, and incarceration or even the death penalty if their acts are found to be voluntary.
To enable the law to join science in a more nuanced and just view of the human mind, this article proposes that, in addition to voluntary and involuntary acts, the criminal law recognize a third category - semi-voluntary acts. Learning Neuroscience the Hard Way: Part I of this article looks at the three main "narratives" that are commonly employed to describe the Schiavo case, and it recounts the basic facts concerning Terri Schiavo's brain injury and the early, but quickly-abandoned, attempt at rehabilitation.
Part II is an examination of how the demise of one of the most profoundly harmful dogmas in the history of medicine-the theory that the brain is "hard-wired" and that no amount of rehabilitation can cause the brain to rewire itself-occurred too late in the litigation for the judges or advocates in either Schiavo or Englaro to understand that Terri and Eluana might actually have been able to communicate "cognitively" rather than physically.
That too is a cautionary tale about the ways in which "iconoclastic researchers" were able to use state-of-the-art diagnostic imaging and aggressive, but then unorthodox, rehabilitation techniques to demonstrate that conventional wisdom in neurology in the s was simply wrong.
Part III develops a model of ethical and effective representation and judging brain injury cases, and Parts IV through VII draw lessons from that model based on the facts of the Schiavo case. This Comment argues that polygraph evidence should be admissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial. Part I discusses the legal background and evolution of case law involving the admissibility of polygraph evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Part II outlines the circuit split between the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals on the admissibility of polygraph evidence in capital sentencing.
Part III argues that courts should admit polygraph evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Supreme Court precedent establishes that expansive standards of evidence govern the penalty phase of a capital trial. Thus, lower courts should permit the admission of polygraph evidence. Second, lower courts incorrectly apply the Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. Scheffer when ruling on polygraph evidence in the penalty phase of a capital trial. In Scheffer, the Supreme Court held that due to reliability concerns, polygraph evidence was inadmissible in a noncapital case.
Finally, a per se ban on the admission of polygraph test results in all criminal proceedings is prejudicial to the defendant. For the reasons mentioned above, the Supreme Court should hold that polygraph test results are admissible as evidence in the penalty phase of a capital trial.
Emerging questions at the interface of law and neuroscience challenge several presumptions at the heart of the legal system. For example, under what circumstances is it a legitimate defense to claim that a brain tumor or idiosyncratic neural wiring was responsible for a behavior? Will neuroscience inform sentencing decisions by offering a better prediction of recidivism? Can novel neuroscience technologies be leveraged for new methods of rehabilitation?
Eagleman addresses these questions with a look toward what neuroscience may and may not be able to tell us about criminal behavior within the next decade. He additionally covers preliminary experimental data from our novel strategy for real-time functional neuroimaging-based rehabilitation, which he discusses on both scientific and ethical grounds. Anger is Not Anger is Not Anger: The article offers information on the various motives behind anger and the reason why they are important in the law of the family.
According to the author, anger has a variety of meanings in different circumstances which is based on models of emotion which are new that relies on principles of evolution and the rising of evidences in neuroscience. It mentions that the coming out of the position of the law and emotions can render the foundation which is needed for a family law that has a new legal theory.
Cruel and Unequal Punishments. This article argues that Atkins v. Virginia and its progeny of categorical exemptions to the death penalty create a new and as of yet undiscovered interaction between the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments of the U. When the United States Supreme Court adapted its proportionality analysis from categories of crime to categories of people, it abandoned intrajurisdictional analysis, a de facto equality consideration under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
The Court, the legal academy, and commentators have failed to consider the remarkable equal protection implications of this doctrinal shift. To see the point in practice, one need only consider two criminal defendants: Under state statutes cited approvingly in Atkins and others enacted since, the first defendant cannot be executed, but the second one can.
This seems wrong on its face, but to understand why, it is necessary to explore the interaction of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The doctrinal shift in Atkins has profoundly altered that interaction, putting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in tension with the Equal Protection Clause. This article illustrates that conflict, and how legislative classifications adopted pursuant to categorical exemptions under the Eighth Amendment may now be subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.
Reciprocal Altruism as the Basis for Contract. Behavioral biologists believe that genes are selfish; they are only interested in their survival. If two humans cooperate in obtaining and allocating resources, they will have greater resources and a greater chance to survive and reproduce, thus continuing their genes. Connected with reciprocal altruism is a human instinct for equity in reciprocal exchanges.
Humans can detect unfair situations and rectify them. Evolutionary fairness is reflected in the contract rules of frustration, unconscionability, and mistake, as well as the good faith duty in performance and unconscionability. Also connected with reciprocal altruism is the need to punish cheaters. In contract law, cheaters - those who breach the contract - are punished through contract remedies.
Finally, contract law helps deal with the evolutionary problem of time-shifted rationality, where individuals value what they have over what they can gain in the future.
Part II of this paper will discuss traditional theories of contract law, including the objective theory of contract formation, deontological and consequentialist approaches, redistributive theories, and more recent theories by Professor Solan contract as agreement and Professor Markovits contract as collaboration. Part III will introduce behavioral biology and explain reciprocal altruism and related doctrines, such as cheating and time-shifted rationality.
It will also show that neuroscientific studies support the existence of reciprocal altruism and related behavioral mechanisms. Part IV will then analyze the relationship between reciprocal altruism and contract law.
It will argue that reciprocal altruism is the best explanation for the formation of contracts, compare reciprocal altruism as the basis of contract to the theories discussed in Part II, examine the other necessary element for contract validity - consideration - under reciprocal altruism, and give a justification for courts to enforce contracts under reciprocal altruism. Part V will demonstrate that contract damages are the glue for reciprocal altruism and that expectation damages are the proper measure of damages under this approach.
Finally, Part VI will deal with reciprocal altruism and other contract issues-gap filling, unallocated risks, good faith in performance, and unconscionability. Emotion, Commitment, and Imagination in Constitutional Culture. Psychopathy and Instrumental Aggression: Evolutionary, Neurobiological, and Legal Perspectives. In the study of aggression, psychopathy represents a disorder that is of particular interest because it often involves aggression which is premeditated, emotionless, and instrumental in nature; this is especially true for more serious types of offenses.
Such instrumental aggression is aimed at achieving a goal e. Unlike the primarily reactive aggression observed in other disorders, psychopaths appear to engage in aggressive acts for the purpose of benefiting themselves. This is especially interesting in light of arguments that psychopathy may represent an alternative life-history strategy that is evolutionarily adaptive; behaviors such as aggression, risk-taking, manipulation, and promiscuous sexual behavior observed in psychopathy may be means by which psychopaths gain advantage over others.
Recent neurobiological research supports the idea that abnormalities in brain regions key to emotion and morality may allow psychopaths to pursue such a strategy—psychopaths may not experience the social emotions such as empathy, guilt, and remorse that typically discourage instrumentally aggressive acts, and may even experience pleasure when committing these acts.
Findings from brain imaging studies of psychopaths may have important implications for the law. Attention Deficit Disorder and the Construction of the Juvenile Offender examines the intersection of race, class and mental health in the juvenile justice system. Using Attention Deficit Disorder ADHD as a lens, this work reveals that the juvenile justice system is currently criminalizing disease and doing so in a discriminatory manner.
The first part of the article lays out the history and original premise of the juvenile justice system. That is, under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state has the authority and obligation to intervene when youth turn to delinquency to provide them with the care and guidance they need to become productive adults in society.
Though it has evolved over time, the core mandate of the juvenile justice system remains the same — to rehabilitate. In particular, this is discussed in three areas: The overlap between ADHD related behavior and delinquent behavior in each of these areas is discussed with particular attention to the specific statutes which render these activities delinquent or criminal.
The neuroscience behind these activities is also brought to bear to establish how, for ADHD youth, the anti-social motive usually associated with delinquent acts is not present. For example, the section on illegal substance use includes a discussion of self-medication with cocaine. As a result, undiagnosed ADHD sufferers might be using cocaine to achieve higher function, not a high, but are exposed to severe criminal sanction nonetheless.
The diagnostic process and the barriers to diagnosis for poor youth of color are illustrated here. Part V details the unconscious bias associated with race and class that prevents judges from recognizing ADHD behavior in poor youth of color, and that ultimately prevent a referral for a more detailed mental health assessment that might lead to a diagnosis.
Part VI goes on to show how the lack of diagnosis ultimately places these youth on a fast track to delinquency when recidivism and offense severity are considered.
Finally, keeping in mind the original premise of the juvenile justice system, I propose solutions for reform, both short term and long term, inside and outside the system. This essay reviews Steven Pinker, The Stuff of Thought Penguin , which offers insights from cognitive science just where it overlaps the most with law - how we use basic cognitive categories like intent, space, time, events and causation.
The Stuff of Thought might offer insights into a broad range of issues in legal theory. Legal theory could make more use of such cognitive science concepts as chunking, recursion, and the primary qualities of an object.
Other topics likewise resonate in thinking about the law: The book suggests that metaphor is an important cognitive tool, but less constraining than might be thought. Linguistic analysis of verb classes and polysemy suggests that words have surprisingly determinate meaning. Our apparent innate sense of causation drawn from an analysis of language sheds light on the legal treatment of causation. Lastly, The Stuff of Thought describes the role of indirect speech, whereby people convey information without revealing their state of mind - which often allows social interaction to proceed smoothly.
Default rules in the law, we suggest, often play an analogous role. The essay then explores the cognitive aspects of stories following literary theorists like Mark Turner who have linked cognitive science with narrative theory , suggesting a recursive definition of story, and another angle to the trolley problem.
Looking at the cognitive role of stories permits a fuller view of legal reasoning, learning, and remembering. This fits well with recent scholarship, such as work on origin stories, and law and genre theory. Third Restatement of Torts: Issue Two Articles and Commentary: A Marriage Mistake Romance. Where the Crawdads Sing. I Will Never Leave You. An Omegaverse Dark Romance. The Very Hungry Caterpillar. Baby Touch and Feel: The Coddling of the American Mind: A Soft and Fuzzy Book for Baby University Four-Book Set.
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